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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the entire Benedict Arnold
Trail-in Maine in terms of historical importance and integrity,
interpretative possibilities of extant sites and structures apropos
to the trail, present conditions, and to provide recommendations
which might include the possibilities for a parkway or scenic road
and related developments.

At the request of Senator Edmund S. Muskie, the National Park Service
N

was asked to investigate Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec which was
recognized as an epic in American military history in studies made
previously by the National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings
and to provide a report with recommendations for presentation to the
Advisory Board.

In compliance with the above request, the writers inspected the area
.during the first week of September

l$6k. The present recommendations

for development of the area are based on this four-day, on-the-ground
study of the route of Arnold in Maine in which all roads paralleling
the Arnold Trail to the Canadian border were studied and the ensuing
principles of development were prepared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the existing highways in the State of Maine which parallel
Arnold's water and protage route be developed to preserve and inter
pret the remaining historic interests associated with Arnold's march

I

on Quebec, to conserve the scenery along the route, and to provide
recreation opportunities.

That the entire route of 19^ miles, as shown on the maps included in this
report, be designated by the State of Ifeine as a scenic road to be
planned, developed and administered by the State Highway Department in
conjunction with the State Park Commission, and that the Federal Govern
ment, at the request of the State, provide assistance in planning if
so requested by the State.

That where no existing highways parallel the water and portage route
followed by Arnold, i.e., between Carrying Place Stream and the town
of Eustis, a distance of 40 miles, that a new road be developed to
scenic highway standards to accomplish the same purposes outlined above
for existing highways.

That the State consider the possibility for enlarging the existing
Beid State Park to include large camping areas.

Beid State Park would

become the southern terminus of the scenic road.

That the State consider the establishment of a large recreation area
in the vicinity of Three C a n y Ponds, or Flagstaff Lake and Mt. Bigelow.

That additional picnic areas and interpretative sites be located at
regular intervals along the scenic route to take advantage of historic
sites or to describe the progress of the army.
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Preservation of Arnold* s route as a recreation waterway or canoe trail
is not .recommended because the Kennebec River above Augusta is clogged
with pulp during the spring and summer and is interspersed with dams.
The remainder of Arnold Trail to the Canadian border contains too
many long and rough portages for pleasurable recreation by canoe or
boat.

The name "scenic road" used in this report is the name chosen by the
President* s Recreation Advisory Council to classify those highways
that have scenic, historic, and recreation potential to be included
in a nationwide program of scenic road development.

A study is now

underway in this regard and the states have been requested for their
recommendations as to those highways and routes to be included in the
program.

THE ARNOLD TRAIL TODAY AMD IRTEBPRETATIVE POSSIBILITIES

Because Arnold* s a m y followed a waiter route through Maine, it is
possible to trace its steps today.
are portions of the Dead River.

The Kennebec is still there.

So

The three ponds on the link between

the Kennebec and Dead Rivers still exist. So do the Chain of Ponds
j
extending from the upper end. of the Dead River to the Height of Land,
the present Maine -Quebec border.

Arnold himself has left a very com

plete journal of his daily activities from the time of his departure
from Fort Western until his arrival at Sartigan, on the Chaudiere.

In

it he noted distances, directions, the location and height of rapids,
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Todd Point at Reid State Park near the mouth
of the Kennebec River. Facilities include
swimming beaches, picnic areas, bathhouse
and refreshment stand. Expansion of this
state park could provide extensive camping
areas at the southern terminis of the suggested
Scenic Road.

At courthouse Point In Dresden is the
Pownal Borough Courthouse, built in
1760 and recently restored and furnished
by the Lincoln County Cultural Historical
Society.

Major Ruben Colburn s House opposite
South Gardiner at Pittstown, M aine.
Major Colburn constructed the Batteaux
and gathered supplies for the army.

Fort Western at Augusta was constructed
in 1754 and restored in 1921. Fort
Western was the starting point of the
expedition.

The original blockhouse at Fort Halifax
in Windslow was constructed in 1754.

State picnic area and interpretative site
south of Skowhegan.

Pulp wood in the Kennebec River, south
of Skowhegan, at the state interpretative
and picnic site.

Looking south at the rapids of the
Kennebec from Foot Bridge at
Skowhegan.

Three miles northwest of Norridgewock
on the west side of the Kennebec,
Mt. Biggelow and Sugarloaf Mountain
Ranges in the distance.

State Interpretative Stop at Lake Wyman
on Route 201 opposite Carrying Place
Stream.

Lake Wyman looking southwest from Route 201
interpretative stop.

County Road on west side of Lake Wyman.
Scenic Road would follow the Lake to
Carrying Place Stream.

Carrying Place Stream entering Lake
Wyman. Point where Arnold's army
left the Kennebec River.

Looking west across Middle Carry Pond.

Logging Road between East Carry Pond
and Middle Carry Pond.

Flagstaff Lake looking northeast toward
Canadian border.

Looking southeast From Flagstaff Lake
toward the Bigelow Mountain Range
from right to left is Cranberry Peak,
East N ubble and the Horns. This area
could become an outstanding State
Recreational Resource.

Cathedral of Pines State Park looking
southeast toward Bigelow Mountain.
Facilities include camping , picnicking
and swimming.

State Picnic Site at the Dead River
where Route 27 crosses.

Chain of Lakes looking west to "Height
of Land" from Route 27,

and many of the landmarks, such as mountains and swamps,

Arnold’s

Journal, along with those kept by others on the expedition, like Meigs,
Dearborn, Senter and Henry, enable us today to trace quite closely the
progress of the army and its activities day by day.

As a result, it

should be an easy matter to devise a vivid and accurate interpretive
program.

Much of the countryside through which the army passed looks much as it
looked in the fall of 1775 •

Except for areas around Augusta, Winslow,

Waterville, Skowhegan, and Madison, there has been moderate urbanization
or commercialization.

The banks of the Kennebec from its mouth to

Bingham are a patchwork of farms and woodlands with most of the people
and diversified industries in the communities oh a narrow strip close
to the river.

In 1775> settlement had already pushed as far north as

Norridgewock Falls, so the character of the region is basically the
same as it was then.

Above Bingham the agricultural section ends, the

land gets more hilly and rocky, and the forest closes in.

Dense forests,

except for a few small villages and isolated cabins, extend north along
the Kennebec, across the Great Carrying Place, up the Dead River, and
along the Chain of Ponds to the Quebec border.

Virtually no virgin

timber remains, but the entire region does give the appearance of a
vast, hostile wilderness, as it did in 1775*

A few of the buildings that the army passed are still, standing.

At

Court House Point in Dresden stands the old Pcwnalborough Court House,
which several of the journalists, like Henry Dearborn, noted as their

k.

military transports carried them up the lower Kennebec.
three-story frame structure, it was built in 1760.

A large, square,

Recently restored

and furnished by the Lincoln County Cultural and Historical Society,
the structure is in good condition.

The old settlement of Pownalborough

was abandoned long ago, and the court house stands alone today, except
for one farm house nearby.

Further upstream, near Fittston, stands the home of Major Colburn, the
man who constructed the batteaux and gathered supplies for the a m y .
Arnold probably spend the nigrt of September 22, 1775, under its roof.
Built in 1765 and presently owned by Mr. and Mrs. Paul Plumer, this
two-story frame building appears to be little altered and is kept in
good repair.

It stands on a small knoll about 200 yards from the

Kennebec and has an excellent view of the valley.

Unfortunately, the

large shipyard along the river has long ago disappeared.

The house,

as the home of a major participant in the expedition, the place where
the batteaux were built and the point where the men transferred from
their transports to the smaller craft, is one of the important points
of interest along the route.

Though there are more m o d e m buildings

nearby, there is nothing that significantly detracts from its historical
value.

At Augusta is Fort Western,

On the head of navigation on the Kennebec,

it was constructed in 175^, during the French and Indian War.

The

original barracks building, a dressed log structure covered with shingles,
was restored in 1921.

It is two and one half stories high, and measures
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100 by 32 feet.

It is in poor repair.

Two small blockhouses, similar

to the originals have been reconstructed, but not on site.

The fort

possesses three interesting items, a plan of the fort drawn in 1755/
an account book for the fort for the year 1767 (Fort Western was then
used as a trading post), and a collection of photographs of the building
going back at least 75 years.

Fort Western is historically important,

for it was the starting point of the expedition.
headquarters from September 23-29, 1775*
barracks building.

Arnold made it his

Much could be done with the

However, it stands today in the middle of an un

attractive industrial area.

A factory sits within 30 feet to the right.

On the other side are reveral warehouses.

The entrance road to the

factory runs through the property and the old parade ground is used as
a parking lot for the employees of the factory.

Situated in the midst

of urban Augusta, it would be very difficult if not impossible to re
create an historical setting at Fort Western.

Eighteen

miles above Augusta, in Winslow, one blockhouse of old Fort

Halifax still stands.

Built in 175^, the original stockade was similar

in design to Fort Western.
night there.

A number of the troops 6pent at least one

The blockhouse is in excellent repair and maintained by

• the local Daughters of the American Revolution chapter.
the surroundings are similar to those at Fort Western.

Unfortunately,
Railroad and

highway bridges flank the structure on the east, and it is surrounded
on the north and west by factories and warehouses.
interpretive program would be very difficult here.
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An effective

The rivers have been altered more than anything since 1775*

The tidal

sections of the Kennebec below Augusta are probably little different
than when the army coasted up them to Colburn* s.
salt marsh and tidal estuaries are unspoiled.

The long reaches of

But, above Augusta, the

Kennebec has an entirely different aspect than it did in 1775*

Dams

have been constructed at 10-15 mile intervals up the river, giving the
stream a rather placid appearance, far different than the quick flowing,
shallow and treacherous Kennebec that the batteaux men knew.

The modern

dams have been constructed at the rapids and falls which gave the de
tachment the most trouble, such as the Ticonic Falls above Fort Halifax
( m o d e m Winslow-Waterville) and the Skowhegan Falls at Skowhegan.

Even

more damaging to the historical scene than the dams themselves are the
unattractive industrial developments that they have attracted and the
subsequent population concentrations that have resulted.

Gone are the

rapids themselves and any traces of the portages the men used to b y 
pass these treacherous stretches of the river.

It is frustrating to

note that, while the banks of the Kennebec a r e .relatively unspoiled
for long distances, the points which are most important historically,
such as Fort Western, Fort Halifax and Skowhegan, are precisely the
isolated points where urbanization of the most unsightly variety has
developed.

In addition to the dams, a second factor has made the Kennebec a far
different stream from that which Arnold* s army knew.

Today pulp wood

is cut in northern Maine and floated down the river to the paper mills.
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Mile after mile of the stream is congested with floating logs, a far
different scene from that of 1775*

One area of historical importance on the upper Kennebec that is relatively
untouched is Norridgewock Falls.

Arnold was at that spot from October 2-9,

1775, while the arny struggled across a mile long portage.

Colburn and

his carpenters made repairs to the batteaux while Arnold inspected the
detachment's supplies for damage.

While there the colonel and others

noted the ruins of the old Indian mission, with its church, fort, and
the grave of its Jesuit mentor.

Located above the modern town of

Norridgewock and on the opposite side of the river, all that remains
today is the grave of Father Bale, the French missionary.
is a modern cemetery.

Not far away

Norridgewock Falls is by far the best location

for archeological exploration and historic development along the Kennebec
above Augusta.

Unfortunately, it would be difficult to bring a scenic

road into the area because it is on a point of land isolated by an im
portant rail line.

In fact, a scenic road on the Norridgewock Falls

side of the Kennebec in this area would be hard to design unless a
long by-pass were constructed around the city of Skowhegan, further
downstream.

Along the Dead River, some of the same conditions exist as along the
Kennebec.

Hie huge Long Falls Dam has created Lake Flagstaff.

Hiis

body of water covers many historic spots, such as the exact point where
the a n y first struck the Dead River and the site of the Indian Natanis*
cabin.

Gone are the endless loops of the lover Dead River and some
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of the falls and carrying places further up.
Eustis is the stream yet in its natural state.

Only above the village of
In fact, the stretch of

the Dead River between Eustis and the Chain of Ponds is the only part
of the army's route where the wild, rapid water that caused so much
grief can still be seen.

The area between the Kennebec and Dead Rivers, which the army knew as
the Great Cariying Place, is the section of Arnold* s route through
Maine which has been altered least.
park development.

It offers the most potential for

Though extensively timbered, it has an extensive

cover of second growth and gives the appearance of being wild and untamed.
Hie only access to the area is by rough logging roads, so only a few
sportsman* s cabins have been built.

The three carry ponds the army

utilized in crossing the region are still in their natural state.

The

exact portages between the Kennebec, the three ponds, and the Dead River
are not known today, but a close examination of the Journals of Arnold
and other participants, together with intensive archeological research
would probably locate these trails.

At the Great Carrying Place there are many opportunities for interpretation.
Arnold reached C a r d i n g place Stream, the beginning of the 14 mile portage
on the morning of October 11, 1775*

He quickly established a camp on

the shore of East Carry Pond, where he remained from October 11-14,
while the army carried its boats and supplies across to the Dead River.
There are many descriptions of this arduous task in the journals of those
who endured them.

Arnold held several important conferences at this
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camp, wrote a number of letters, and there made some of the decisions
that affected the outcome of the expedition.

He also ordered two

buildings constructed, one a small hospital between East and Middle
Carry Ponds, the second a store house for the provisions he wished to
hold in reserve.

The latter was located somewhere between the Kennebec

and East Carry Pond.

Late on October 1^, Arnold broke camp and moved across the portage as
far as West C a n y Pond.

By the evening of October 15, he was at the

edge of a treacherous bog, described by him and almost all the other
diarists.

It took Arnold all the morning of the l£th to cross the bog,

and it was not until afternoon that he reached Bog Brook, where the
boats could again be launched.

In le6s than a mile Bog Brook flowed

into the Bead River.

Thus Arnold was in the region of the Great Carrying Place from October
ll~l£.

The area was one of the most difficult to traverse.

decisions were made in the locality.

Important

The area is Isolated and its

environment is virtually unchanged since the time of the march.

As a

result of all these factors, the Great Carrying Place offers excellent
possibilities for interpretation.

BENEDICT ARNOLD TRAIL SCENIC ROAD

A.

Brief Description of the Recommended Benedict Arnold Trail Scenic
Road.
(Please fold out the maps at the end of this section.)

The southern terminus would be at Reid State Park located on Georgetown
Island between the mouths of the Kennebec and Sheepscot Rivers.

This

792 -acre park is well developed for picnicking, swimming, fishing, and
10

hiking and has two snack bars.

As a termination for Arnold*s memorial

it would he advantageous to add camping facilities so tourists could
have more time to travel along the southern portion of the Kennebec
River and also see Fort Baldwin on the west side of the Kennebec*
Further investigation of Reid State Park might reveal the need for the
acquisition of additional acreage to accommodate a large camping
facility.

/

From Reid State Park northward the road would follow existing highways
that border the Kennebec River on the east side for 75 miles to
Pish on Ferry.

At Pishon Ferry the route would cross on an existing bridge to Hinckley
and then proceed north on the west side of the river to Carrying Place
Stream, a distance of approximately 132 miles from the southern
terminus.

Cities and towns north of Randolph would be bypassed.

No highways exist that parallel Arnold's route between Carrying Place
Stream and the town of Stratton, a distance of 31 miles.
that a new section of scenic road,

It is suggested

bO miles long, be located in this

highly scenic and relatively undeveloped section of Somerset and Franklin
Counties, Maine.

The scenic road would serve as a connecting link

between the scenic road described, and by circumventing the existing
and proposed developments together with the towns of Stratton and Eustis,
would connect with State Highway 27 north of Eustis.
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This 40-mile section

•would closely parallel and preserve Benedict Arnold's Trail and make It
available so the public could follow it on foot and by boat.

Facilities

for picnicking and camping could be provided and perhaps a lodge and
restaurant established.

There would also be opportunities for swimming

and fishing.

Due to this section's relatively short length and the region's particularly
fine scenic qualities the land requirements in this section might far ex
ceed that required for the portion of the scenic road south of Carrying
Place Stream.

For instance, the Three Carry Ponds could be preserved

within the boundaries* of the scenic road as well as a large area on the
south shore of Flagstaff Lake.

This area in particular might provide

the State with an outstanding recreational area and include facilities
for day and overnight use.
»
Consideration might also be given to an even more extensive recreational
development on Flagstaff Lake to include portions of Bigelow (fountain
for the specific purpose of creating a State ski and winter sports de
velopment on its slopes.

Further study by the State might indicate

that the mountain slopes are suitable for this type of development and
a need exists.

Winter use would not only extend the season of use for

a large recreational development, but would further satisfy the need
for the suggested ^0-mile section of the scenic road from Carrying Place
Stream to Eustis.

Hie accommodations needed for visitor use during the

winter season might be so designed and located as to be used by visitors
of the scenic road and recreation development on Flagstaff Lake during
the regular summer and fall recreation season.
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From Eustis north to the Canadian border the existing highway would
again be utilized as a scenic road because it closely parallels Arnold* s
route along the north branch of the Dead River.

The north branch, Chain

Lakes, Horseshoe Stream, Horseshoe Pond, and Arnold's Pond should be
acquired to preserve Arnold's route and provide areas for recreation.

At the Canadian border, -a distance of 19^ miles from Reid State Park,
an intezpretive and welcoming station should be located to explain the
Arnold Memorial and its purposes of preserving the scenery and provide
recreation.

B.

Principles Governing the Conversion of Highways to the Benedict
Arnold Trail Scenic Road

1.

The Scenic and Historic Corridor

The corridor is to be composed of the existing right-of-way,
proposed right-of-way, scenic easements, and lands for historic pre
servation and interpretation and for recreation.

a.

Proposed Right-of-Way

A basic right-of-way width of 220 feet is recommended.

This

width need not be uniform with the middle of the highway and might be
adjusted to prevent the moving of buildings, but no building should be
closer than 75 feet to the highway centerline, unless perhaps it has
historic significance.

.
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Congested areas with many buildings close to the highway and most towns
and cities should be bypassed so that the 220 feet of basic right-ofway can be achieved.

In addition to the basic right-of-way, an additional 100 feet should be
acquired in fee simple through woods or forests.

This will provide a

strip of woods bordering the highway of 210 feet (less the roadway and
slopes) which is considered a minimum width needed to support an eventual
stand of mature forest cover.

This width will also screen from the

public the harvesting of forest products by private enterprise.

Submarginal lands, or portions of them, lying adjacent to the basic
right-of-way should be purchased outright.

These lands would include

but not be limited to marshes, steep hillsides, sand dunes, rock outcrops,
streams, and unproductive lands.

Many of these lands will be attractive

to view and will remain so if placed under public ownership.

Some of

them will provide room for parking or active recreation and may contain
natural, historic, or archeological interests.

Land of sufficient width for future interchanges with major traffic
arteries should also be acquired initially.

b.

Scenic Easements

Through open farmland additional land controls should be
established through the acquisition of a strip of scenic easement con
tiguous with the right-of-way lines, if such is needed to protect views
and the immediate roadsides.

14.

In acquiring the scenic easement the right of the owner to change the
use of his land is purchased.

That is, in open fannland (croplands or

pastures) the owner may continue to farm the land hut cannot change its
use to residential, commercial, or industrial development or permit the
erection of advertising signs, utility lines, or create trash heaps,
auto dumps, etc.

In effect, scenic protection is acquired at an esti

mated fraction of the cost of outright purchase and the desirable farm
scene is maintained by the farmer at no cost to the taxpayer.

The widths of scenic easement would generally average about 300 feet to
500 feet but these widths might be decreased or increased by natural
barriers such as ridge tops or woods.

An alternate means of obtaining the same amount of scenic protection
would be to purchase in fee simple the full width and then lease the
land back to the former owner for farming.

c.

Lands for Recreation and Tourist Accommodations

As a guide to location of recreation areas it is suggested
that day-use areas (picnicking, restaurants, gas stations, boat launching,
etc., in any combination providing only day use) be spaced 25 to 1*0
miles apart and that combination-use areas (picnicking and camping,
lodges, gas, meals, etc., in any combination providing both day and'
overnight use) be spaced 50 to 80 miles apart.

If either of these areas

can be combined with historic or scenic values, the visit of the tourist
to them will be more attractive.

Otherwise, the selection of sites for

recreation and history must depend on opportunities.
15.

For sanitary reasons we recommend against the installation of individual
picnic tables placed at intervals along the route.

Picnic tables should

be installed in sufficient numbers to justify development of a potable
water supply and construction of pit toilets at least.

Comfort stations

with running water and a sewage disposal system are, of course, superior
to pit toilets and their construction is encouraged for all public use
areas.

Sufficient land should be acquired for development to allow for present
needs and future expansion.

As a guide, an average of about five camp

sites per acre will be realized depending on topography and other camp
ground site conditions.

This figure includes all roads, parking, comfort

stations, and other community-use facilities.

Picnic sites will average

between 10 to 15 to the acre.

Tourist accommodations and services such as motels and restaurants and
gas stations can be provided by private enterprise outside of public
owned lands between Reid State Park and Bingham.

However, between

Bingham and the Canadian border, the northern terminus, it appears that
these accommodations and services should be developed either with public
funds on public land or by private enterprise on public land under con
cession agreements.

One of the purposes of providing scenic controls is to eliminate *
billboards along the Benedict Arnold Trail Scenic Road.

In lieu of

billboards lt is recommended that information centers be located at each
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end of the project and at the outskirts of the cities and towns to provide
tourist with information concerning accommodations, goods, and services
available nearby.

Most of this information would be presented through

poster type advertising or pamphlets.

These stations should be on

off-road parking areas and might be manned during the busy tourist
season.

2.

Control of Access

It would be desirable to limit the number of private and public
access points to no more than four per side per mile.

This could be

accomplished by constructing paralleling collection of the access rights,
or by relocating the scenic road around the constricted area.

Unrestricted access contributes greatly to reduction in the pleasure
of driving.

Every point of access is a potential point of collision

and several access points placed close together cause traffic to decel
erate and thus reduce the capacity of the pavement.

Any access permitted without restriction on use will allow developments
of any kind to take place outside the right-of-way and if the right-ofway is narrow, the road can become constricted with unsightliness and
a source of casualties and property damage.

Consequently, we recommend

that each access point permitted be also limited in its use.
predominantly rural or forested area we anticipate

In this

that use restrictions

will be mostly for residential, farm, or forest use— generally not
commercial or industrial.

17

3*

Design Standards

For purposes of this memorial drive featuring historical, scenic,
and recreation interests the standards of roadway design need be no higher
than necessary for leisurely pleasure driving in passenger cars.

It

would be well if these standards could prevail because they will permit
the fitting of the road to topography with pleasant curvilinear align
ment resulting in minimum disfigurement to the landscape.

Some of the

highways selected for the memorial route are low class gravel or black
top roads used primarily as access to farms and residences.

'When these

roads are reconstructed or reconditioned the above guidelines for pleasure
driving should be followed.

However, some of the highways selected are

arteries for mixed traffic and their primary purpose must be considered
when selecting standards for their reconstruction or reconditioning.
Consequently, there will be a variety of standards along the suggested
memorial.

The design standards covered in the publication A Policy on

Geometric Design of Rural Highways by -Hie American Association of State
Highway Officials are flexible enough to meet most conditions.

As a possible exception to these standards it is suggested that Route 128
south of Randolph be maintained about as it is with the exception of
black topping the gravel portion.

It is a narrow, winding, tree-fringed

road that is dangerous to drive at maximum lawful speeds.
a real pleasure to drive at a slow speed.

It is also

Before improving the standards

of width and alignment on this road, it is suggested that serious con
sideration be given to reducing the speed limit so the charm of its
environment can be appreciated.
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C.

Further Study Needed

If the Benedict Arnold Trail is to be memorialized by the State of Maine
according to the above recommendations further study is needed to
graphically illustrate these recommendations.

Hie detailed recommenda

tions are needed to provide a basis for estimate of cost.

The present recommendations for development of the possible memorial
are based on a four-day, on-the-ground study in which all roads paral
leling the Arnold Trail to the Canadian border were studied and the
principles of development outlined above were prepared.

While the time

allotted was sufficient to determine broad concepts, details could not
possibly have been delineated.

The further study should include detailed plans and recommendations for
right-of-way taking, historic site acquisition, scenic easement purchase,
recreation areas, and access control and would include an estimated
cost of development.

'Such a study could be conducted by the Maine State

Highway Commission in cooperation with the State Park and Historical
Commission.

Hie study might also be initiated by the National Park

Service in cooperation with the Bureau of Public Hoads if the State re
quested it and authorization of the United States Congress was provided
and funds made available.

Hie Federal agencies would, of course,

cooperate in the study with interested State agencies.

The following two maps depict the route in Maine which Benedict Arnold
and the army covered on their march to Quebec.

19.

The suggested scenic

road location is shown by a combination of solid and dashed lines;

The

solid line indicates that portion of the route where existing highways
and roads might be utilized,.and the dashed line indicates where new
construction or by-pass roads are suggested.

The chronological events

that occurred during the army's march are shown in the Appendix following
the section on histozy.

20

along the Kennebec, Dead, and Chaudiere.

Had there been more preliminary

i

study of the rapid streams, the use of batteaux would have been rejected.
Canoes would have been utilized, and the arny would have moved faster
and arrived in Quebec prepared to storm the city.
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APPENDICES

A.

Arnold's March to Quebec

B•

Maps

ARNOLD'S MARCH TO QUEBEC

The invasion of Canada was one of the first military operations of the
Revolutionary War.

To the revolting colonists, the vast territory to

the north looked threatening.

In

117k, when Parliament closed the Port

of Boston, it also passed the Quebec Act.

Viewed from any angle, this

enactment looked ominous to American interests.

By extending the

boundaries of Canada south to the Ohio River, it excluded Americans
from a valuable Indian Trade west of the Appalachians and halted
American expansion westward.

Even worse, by re-establishing French

civil law and the Roman Catholic Church, it threatened to bring the
French-Canadian inhabitants into a close alliance with the British.
Fran Canada, the colonists could foresee the redcoats, with their Indian
dependents and potential Canadian allies, descending without warning
upon the long, unprotected American frontier, thereby crippling the
entire war effort.

Always fearing the worst, the revolutionaries did see hope in the
Canadian situation.

Ibere were, among the predominantly French settlers,

a number of extremely vocal "old subjects," men of English blood who had
come to Canada after its conquest from France.

These men were primarily

merchants and traders, and their aspirations were similar to those of
their neighbors to the south.

They were very hostile to the royal

government as a result of the Quebec Act, which seemed to take from them
traditional English rights, like a representative assembly and trial by

jury.

An even brighter hope was the prospect of securing assistance

from the French peasantry itself.

While the habitants liked many of the

provisions of the Quebec Act, they disliked others.

They were particularly

fearful that the new legislation would force them to again pay tithes to
the Church and would require then to serve in the military under the old
French nobility, whom they despised.

Nevertheless, it was not until the British capitulation at Fort Ticonderoga
on May

9, 1775> followed by the American capture of Crown Point the follow

ing day, and the successful raid on the British post at St. John's on
May 17, that Americans began to think seriously about an expedition
against Canada.

Upon first hearing of the incredulous success of American

arms in the Lake Champlain area under the leadership of Benedict Arnold
and Ethan Allen, the first impulse of the Continental Congress was to
quickly evacuate the captured stores, and withdraw.^

However, reports

continued to drift down from the north telling of British weakness.

It

was learned that Guy Carleton, the royal governor had only 550 regulars
to defend all of Canada, and that neither the French Canadians nor the
Indians were rushing to his aid.

Congress, realizing that the Americans

were in control of the principal invasion route north, and that the door
to Canada was wide open, eventually took action.

In late June, 1775>

Major General Philip Schuyler was sent north, with orders to defend

■^Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution (Boston, Houghton
Mifflin Company, 193*0/ PP* 1 * A - W .
2 Ibid., pp. 151-154

2

Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and If practical, and not disagreeable to
the Canadians, to push on to St. John's, Montreal, and other parts of
Canada.^

Throughout the summer of 1775; Schuyler and his second in command,
Brigadier General Hi chard Montgomery, prepared for a thrust into Canada.
Plagued with bickering among the troops, and endless delays in securing
men and supplies, the undertaking was tediously slow in getting underway.
Nevertheless, by August 23, Schuyler had gathered enough supplies to
provision an expedition for 20 days and had constructed enough boats to
transport 1300 men north.^

Sir Guy Carleton had not been idle since the British defeats at Ticonderoga
and Crown Point.

Though his resources were scant, he did everything in his

power to gird his province for attack.

He decided to contest every inch

of ground he could, and by July he had over

kOQ men at St. John's improving

the fortifications and preparing to put up a stiff resistance.

Schuyler

would have to fight if he wanted Canada.^

At headquarters in Cambridge, the Commander in Chief of the Continental
Army, George Washington, was watching the progress of the Canadian
campaign with great interest.

By mid-August, intelligence from scouts

attached to Schuyler's force, and from other sources, indicated that almost
all the small British force in Canada had been thrown into the Montreal and

^ A H e n French, The First Year of the American Revolution (Boston, Houghton
Mifflin Company, 193*0; PP- 1 ^ - 1 5 9
^French, The First Year, p. 390.
5lbid., p. 385-
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St. John 18 area to slow down the expected attack from Lake Champlain.

As

a result, the important fortress city of Quebec was vulnerable, being
guarded by only a handful of men.

In fact, one report, from a Caughnawago

Indian chief named Louis, asserted that Quebec defended by a single
sergeant and five privates.

6

As the reports trickled in from the fortress city on the St. Lawrence,
headquarters turned its eyes in that direction.

By August 20, 1775,

Washington had devised a way to badly discomfort the British there.

On

that date he dispatched a messenger to Ticonderoga to inform Schuyler of
his thinking and seek his advise.

The idea, Washington wrote, had been

carefully considered in Cambridge for several days and was to

penetrate Canada by way of the Kennebec Biver, and so to
Quebeck by a Rout ninety miles below Montreal. I can very
well spare a Detachment for this purpose of one Thousand
or twelve Hundred men, and the Land Carriage by the Rout
proposed is too inconsiderable to make an objection. If
you are resolved to proceed, which I gather from your last
Letter is your Intention, it would make a Diversion that
would distract Carlton, and facilitate your Views.
He must either break up and follow this Party to Quebeck,
by which he will leave you a free Passage, or he must suffer
that important Place to fall into our Hands, an Event, which
would have a decisive Effect and Influence on the Publick
Interests.*
g
Justin H. Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth. Colony; Canada and the
American Revolution, (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907)* I. p. 502.
7
•Letter of George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, Cambridge,
August 20, 1775* in John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington
from the Original Manuscript Sources, 17^-5-1799 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1931;, H I , PP- W - W -

k

Washington asked Schuyler if and when his force would move into Canada,
and for any additional details Schuyler might have on conditions in that
country, such as the sentiments of the inhabitants and of the Indians,
and how many men were at Quebec.

Schuyler was to reply without delay.

8

The idea of using the Kennebec River in Maine as a route into Canada was
not original with Washington or his Cambridge staff.

As early as the

middle of the 17th century, French missionaries had used the route.

By-

canoe, they would travel up the Chaudiere River, a stream that flowed into
the St. Lawrence about four miles above Quebec, to its source.

From there,

it was a four mile portage across the watershed to the source of the
Kennebec, which ultimately led them south toward the Atlantic.

Three

succeeding French Jesuits bad worked among the Abenaki Indians of Maine,
and the tribe was completely converted.

The last of these priests, Father

Sebastien Rale, had an extensive mission on the Kennebec at Norridgewock.9
As early as 1682, the Kennebec-Chaudiere route had been -vaguely sketched
on a French Navy Department map.

As knowledge grew, new French and

English maps showed more details.3'0

In 1760, John Montressor, a British

^Letter of George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, Cambridge,
August 20, 1775> in John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington
from the Original Manuscript Sources 17^-5-1799 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 19 31 ), III, p*.ta§
.
9Justin H. Smith, Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec, A Critical Study,
Together with a Reprint of Arnoldfs Journal {.New York, G. P. Putnam *r. Sons7
1903), P. 9.
10Ibid., pp. 3-1*-

5

Army engineer, had followed the route from Quebec to the Kennebec and back.
The Americans had a copy of Montressor 's map and an imperfect copy of his
journal.

11

During the l8th century struggles between France and Ibgland, military
use of the Kennebec-Chaudiere route had been proposed several times,
though never effected.

As a result, both British and colonists were

aware of its potentials when the Revolution broke out.

Immediately

General Carleton stationed a small guard of fusileers on the Chaudiere to
watch for signs of American activity.

Likewise,, in late April, 1775*

citizens of Portland, Maine, sent two scouts up the Kennebec to look for
indications of a British incursion.

12

A proposal for an attack on Canada by the Kennebec was made in the spring
of 1775-

Colonel Jonathan Brewer of Massachusetts submitted a plan for

leading 500 volunteers by the Kennebec and Chaudiere Rivers against
Quebec to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.

Nothing came of Brewer's

suggestion, but it is possible that Washington knew of it.

13

11 Justin H. Smith, Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec, A Critical Study,
Together with a Reprint of Arnold's Journal (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1903), p. 17p. 21.
13Smith, The Fourteenth' Colony. I, p. ^98 .
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On August 14,

1115, Chief Swashan and four St. Francis Indians arrived

in Cambridge from Canada.

With them came a shipbuilder from the Kennebec

Valley, Major Reuben Colburn.

It is likely that the appearance of this

band at headquarters had much to do with Washington's decision to attack
Quebec.

Chief Swashan's information confirmed other reports from Canada

concerning the weakness of Quebec.

Even more interesting was the fact

that they had come from* a village on the St. Lawrence above Quebec by the
Chaudiere and Kennebec.

As a result of this visit, both the weakness of

the fortress city and a way of taking advantage of that weakness were
brought into sharp f o c u s . ^

Benedict Arnold had been a leader in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga.
However, disputes over command of the forces in the Lake Champlain area
led to his resignation in late June.^

He was in Cambridge in August to

settle accounts with the Massachusetts authorities, under whose orders he
had acted in the northern theater.

Washington had met him and was impressed

by his initiative, energy and executive ability.1^

Whether Arnold had any

thing to do with suggesting the Quebec expedition to the Commander in Chief,
we do not know.

It is more likely that Washington first decided upon the

venture, then asked Arnold to command it.^T

^Smith, The Fourteenth Colony, I p. 501.
^French, The First Year, p. 158 .
•^Staith, The Fourteenth Colony* I, pp. 495-496.
17Ibid., pp. 498-499-

7

Arnold accepted Washington's offer vithout qualification and immediately
threw himself into the project.

On August 21, the day after Washington's

letter to Schuyler, he was already writing to Colburn, the Kennebec River
shipbuilder, to inquire
how soon, there can be procured, or built, at Kennebec
Two hundred light Battoos Capable of Carrying Six or Seven
Men each, with their Provisions and Baggage, (say 100 wt.
to each man) the Boats to be furnished with four Oars two
Paddles and two Setting Poles each, the expence of Building
them and wheather a Sufficient quantity of Rails can be
procured with you.-*-”
Other important details had to be known, as well, like the quantity of
beef available in the area, and the topography of the region, the hills
and swamps, the depth and swiftness of the rivers, and the number of
carrying places. 19

For the l8th century, the speed with which the project moved was remarkable.
On September 27, Schuyler replied from Albany that Montgomery

was embarking

immediately for St. John's, that he definitely intended to penetrate into
Canada.

Moreover, there was no more than a single company at Quebec.

Schuyler's letter had reached Washington by September 2.

On that date, the

Commander in Chief ordered Nathaniel Tracy of Newburyport to start collecting
transport ships to ferry the men from Massachusetts to M a i n e . A l s o by
that date, Major Colburn had also returned to Cambridge with his report to
Arnold.

On September 3> 1775 > the shipbuilder was ordered to return to

^ L e t t e r of Benedict Arnold to Reuben Colburn, Cambridge, August 21, 1775>
in Smith, Arnold's March, p. 75*
‘^Ibid., pp. 75-76.
20Saith, The Fourteenth Colony, I, p. 50 ^.
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his home in Gardinerstown and begin work immediately on the 200 batteaux.
He was to engage 20 men to act as carpenters and guides, and also begin
collection for the commissary of 60 barrels of salted beef, plus all the
pork and flour he could lay his hands on.

For his efforts, he would

receive 40 shillings for each boat.

With transportation and supplies taken care of, the next step, finding the
men, was rapidly effected.

On September 5, the call went out from head

quarters for "Volunteers, as are active Woodsmen, and well acquainted with
batteaux. .."22

To serve on the expedition with Colonel Arnold, there were

to be 2 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 10 captains, 30 subalterns, 30
sergeants, 30 corporals, and 676 privates.

In addition, there were to be

one company of Virginia riflemen and two rifle companies from Pennsylvania.23
Recruiting went well, and by September 8 , the volunteers were ordered to
assemble and march to Cambridge Common, to be joined by the rifle companies
ph
the following morning.

Of the rifle companies, Daniel Morgan was in command of the Virginians,
Captain William Hendricks led one company from Pennsylvania and Captain
Matthew Smith the other.

Altogether the riflemen numbered about 250.

musketmen, numbering 742, were formed into two battalions.

The

The first,

commanded by Lt. Colonel Roger Enos and Major Return J. Meigs, both of
Connecticut, consisted *of the companies of Captains Thomas Williams of
pp
General Orders, Cambridge, September 5, 1775> in Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington, III, p. 473-

2 3lbid., p. 4732^General Orders, Cambridge, September 8 , 1775> in Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington, III, pp. 482-483*
Q

Massachusetts, Henry Dearborn of New Hampshire, Oliver Hanchet of
Connecticut, William Goodrich of Massachusetts and Scott, whose first name
is unknown.

The second battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Christopher

Greene of Rhode Island and Major Timothy Bigelow of Massachusetts, included
the companies of Captains Samuel Ward of Rhode Island, and Simeon Thayer,
John Topham, Jonas Hubbard, and Samuel McCobb, all of Massachusetts.
Unfortunately, most of the musketmen were not frontiersmen at all, but
New England faimers.

In addition to the rifle and musket companies, there

were others like the quartermasters, the chaplain, the surgeon, and six
unattached volunteers.

One of the latter was Aaron Burr of New Jersey.

The total force amounted to 1,051

men.

On September 11, the rifle companies marched for Newburyport, where they
were to board transports for the trip up the coast tojEalne.
on the 13th.

They arrived

By September 15, the entire detachment was in or near that

seacoast t o w n . ^

Arnold's orders were made up on September 14.
repeatedly stressed one matter.

The army was not to do anything that might

offend the Canadians or the Indians.

Purchases were to be made in specie.

The strictest discipline was to be maintained.
ing.

In them, Washington

There was to be no plunder

Above all, there was to be no interference with the religion of the

country.^

^Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New York; The Macmillan
Company, 1952), I, pp. I65 -16 &.
^Smith, Arnold's March, pp. 58 -6 1 .
^Instructions of George Washington to Colonel Benedict Arnold, Cambridge,
October 1^, 1TT5> in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, pp. lj.9 i-lj.96 .
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Arnold left Cambridge on September 15, and arrived in Newburyport that
pO

evening.

On September 18, the men, aboard 11 small vessels, began the

sea leg of their journey.

Arnold, aboard the schooner "Broad Bay," made

good time and had reached the mouth of the Kennebec on the 19 th.

The

ship paused there to await the arrival of the others, most of which arrived
on September 20.

The Kennebec was large enough so that the ships were able

to go up as far as Major Colburn's shipyard at Gardinerstown (now Pittston),
and by September 22, Arnold was there.2 ^

Here the colonel inspected the

batteaux that were to carry his army through the wilderness, and here he
received the latest intelligence from Colburn's scouts.

The report of the guides, Denis Getchel and Samuel Berry was disappointing.
They had not reconnoitered the entire route to Quebec, but had ventured
only about 30 miles beyond the Great Carrying Place.

On the Dead River

they had run into an Indian by the name of Natanis who had threatened to
report their movements to General Carleton and had told them that on the
Chaudiere River, a British officer with six men were on guard.

The guides

also heard that there was a large contingent of hostile Mohawks at
Sartigan, the first French settlement on the Chaudiere.
and Berry turned back, their mission incomplete.

Fearful, Getchel

Even their description

of the area they did traverse was sketchy.3°

^^Letter of Benedict Arnold to /Schuyler/, Point aux Trembles, November 27,
1775, in Kenneth Roberts, Editor, March to Quebec; Journals of the Members
of Arnold's Expedition (New York; Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 193*4),
pp. 97-9829
^Simeon Thayer, Journal of Captain Simeon Thayer's March Through the
Wilderness to Quebec, in Roberts, March to Quebec, p.
30gmith, Arnold's March, pp. 80-82.
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Since information on conditions along the route was still scanty, Arnold
probably did not realize, as he inspected Colburn's batteaux, just how
unsuited for the journey they were.

They were a type of boat common on

the Kennebec and had narrow, flat bottoms, widely flaring sides, and long,
pointed stems and sterns.

In the gentle waters of the lower Kennebec,

they were ideal, since they could carry heavy loads and they were not
easily capsized.^1

However, nobody— Washington, Arnold, or even Major

Colburn— had any notion of actual conditions on the upper reaches of the
Kennebec and beyond.

As a result, instead of taking canoes which would

have been easy to carry around the many rapids and waterfalls on the route,
the expedition was weighted down with the batteaus.

The vessels were

cumbersome by nature, and the difficulties of using them were compounded
because they had been hastily made of green pine boards.

32

Within a few

days, most of them were leaking, causing the destruction of badly needed
foodstuffs and supplies.33

For the next few days the army was engaged in transferring supplies from
the ships to the batteaux and bringing the small boats up from Major
Colburn's to Fort Western, the head of navigation,
of the Kennebec.

k6 miles from the mouth

The outpost, at m o d e m Augusta, was to be the jumping

off point for the expedition.3^

3%ard, The War of the Revolution, p. 168.
3^Isaac Senter, Journal of Dr. Isaac Senter, in Roberts, March to Quebec,
P. 199-

33
^ G e o r g e Morrison, Journal of the Expedition to Quebec, in Roberts, March
to Quebec, p. 511.
3^Senter, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 199-
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Arnold reached Port Western on September 2 3 .

Immediately he dispatched

several advance parties to fill in the scanty knowledge of the way ahead.
One group, under the leadership of Lt. Archibald Steele, was to locate and
mark the various carrying places along the route.

In birch bark canoes,

this party with little trouble covered 1 5 -2 0 miles a day and had reached
the watershed between the Kennebec and Chaudiere by October 8.35

At Port Western, the army was divided into four divisions.

The First

Division, consisting of Morgan's, Smith's and Hendrick's Rifle Companies
started out on September 25-

It was expected that being first, they

would have time to clear some of the portages for the others, particularly
those at the Great Carrying Place between the Kennebec and Dead Rivers.
The following day, the Second Division under Lt. Colonel Greene and Major
Bigelow, with three of the musket companies departed.3^

The Third Division,

commanded by Major Meigs, with the companies of Hanchet, Ward, Dearborn
and Goodrich departed September 27*

The Rear Division, under Lt. Colonel

Enos, oonsistedof Scott’s, McCobb's, and Williams' companies.

Scott and

McCobb left Port Western on September 29, Enos, with Captain Williams'
company, was to follow with extra provisions.

At noon on September

29, Arnold himself headed north.

shoddy as the batteaux the men were plagued with.

His canoe was as

At Vassalborough, only

8 miles upstream, it was leaking so badly that he was forced to transfer
to a pirogue or dugout canoe.

That might he lodged about 4 miles below

.John Joseph Henry, Campaign Against Quebec, in Roberts, March to
Quebec, pp. 30^-317•
3^Henry Dearborn, Journal of the Quebec Expedition, in Roberts, March to
Quebec 3 p. 132.
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Fort Halifax.

By 10 the next morning, Arnold reached Fort Halifax, 18

miles above Fort Western, where he caught up with Dearborn's and Goodrich's
companies struggling over a 60 rod carrying place around the Ticonic Falls.
Here the colonel was able to hire a team to carry his baggage around the
falls and the 5 miles of rapids above.

By evening, he had come up to

Meigs and his Division, about 6 l/2 miles above Fort Halifax.

On the first day of October, the commander moved rapidly up the quick
flowing river, surmounted Skowhegan Falls, at 5 P*m. and lodged 5 miles
above at Widow Warren 1s .

By the morning of October 2, he had reached

Norridgewock Falls, about 50 miles above Fort Western.

Here at the last

settlement on the Kennebec and the site of Father Rale's Indian Mission,
there was a 1500 yard portage which brought the army's progress to a creep.
Two sleds and oxen were obtained to assist the men, but each division took
at least a day to move their supplies around the falls.

Arnold remained

at Norridgewock a full week, until the last division was over the portage.
During this period, he inspected the provisions of each company, and found
much of the food had been ruined by water in the batteaux.

Meanwhile,

Major Colburn and his carpenters were put to work repairing the flimsy
boats as best they could.

On October

9, with all four divisions now ahead of him, the colonel moved

forward again.

Next morning he passed the 15 foot high Caratunk Falls.

The river became more rapid and more shallow as the mountains started
closing in.
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On Wednesday* October 11* Arnold reached the Great Carrying Place* where
the army was to leave the Kennebec River and carry their boats across 14
miles of hills and swamps to the Dead River* a branch of the Kennebec.
Fortunately there were 3 ponds along this route to provide the men with
a little respite from the bach-breaking task of hauling batteaux and
supplies across such a long stretch.

As Arnold reached the Carrying Place*

he found that both Morgan*s and Greene's Divisions had pushed through to
the second pond, known as Middle Carry Pond today.

Meigs had Just arrived.

That day Arnold moved the 3 l A miles across rough country to the first*
or Bast Carry Pond* where he remained until late on the l4th.

At this

camp* beside a lake full of trout* several important matters were decided.
First was a conference with Lieutenants Steele and Church* who had Just
returned from their survey of the country ahead.

They reported that it

was 80 miles from the point where the troops would enter the Dead River
to the place where the portage to the Chaudiere began.

While 30 miles of

the way would be in deep* calm water* there were 5 falls and plenty of
rapid water beyond.^7
reports had been.

Arnold now realized Just how faulty all previous

Washington had believed the distance of the Dead River

leg of the Journey to be 30 miles.3®

Getchel and Berry had not revealed

anything about the falls and rapid water* because they had failed to go
very far up the Dead River .39

37B e n ed ict A rnold* C o lo n e l A rn o ld 's J o u rn a l o f H is E x p e d itio n to Canada*
in R o b erts, M arch to Quebec* pp. ^5-50*
3^Letter of George Washington to the President of Congress* Cambridge*
September 21, 1775* in Smith, Arnold *s March* p. 23
39smith* Arnold's March* p. 8 l
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Steele and Church had done a good job, so Arnold decided to use than
further.

They were again sent ahead, Church with 20 a m e n and a surveyor

to clear portages along the Dead River and Steele to go beyond for a
careful examination of the falls and portages on the Chaudiere as far as
the first French settlements.

Steele and Church reported one hopeful fact.
or British spies on the Dead River.
though rough, would be unobstructed.
sent several messengers forward.

They had run into no Indians

It looked as if the road to Quebec,
ko

therefore on October 13, Arnold

An Indian named Aeneas and another Indian

were sent to Quebec with a letter to American sympathizers there to inform
them that the Continental troops were on the way.

These friends were asked

to send back intelligence on British strength at Quebec,

the sentiment of

the inhabitants, and news of General Schuyler *s expedition.

Arnold also
ki

enclosed a second letter, which he asked be forwarded to Schuyler.

This

second letter infoimed the Commander in Chief of the Northern Army that
things were going well and that Arnold hoped "in a fortnight of having the
pleasure of meeting you in Quebec."^

That same day, October 13, Arnold wrote Washington, informing the Commander
of his progress, which he felt had been good.

It had been a hard march

and the men had been forced to wade in the stream and drag their batteaux
behind than more than half, the time.

Nevertheless, the first 3 divisions

^Arnold, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 50-51-

IlI
Letter of Benedict Arnold to John Manir, Carrying Place, October 1 3 , 1775>
in Roberts,. March to Quebec, p p . 6 9 -7 0 .
^ L e t t e r of Benedict Arnold to Philip Schuyler, Carrying Place, October 13 ,
1775* in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 7 1 -7 2 .
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<
were rapidly crossing the Great Carrying Place, the last division had
arrived, and he had high hopes of reaching the Chaudiere in 8 to 10 days.
Morale was excellent, and he could still count 950 effectives.

There were

sufficient provisions for 25 days, certainly enough to reach Quebec.

As a

footnote, the colonel added this bit of description:
P.S. Your excellency may possibly think that we have
been tardy in our march, as we have gained so little;
but when you consider the badness and weight of the
batteaux and the large quantity of provisions, etc.,
we have been obliged to force up against a veiy rapid
stream, where you would have taken the men for
amphibious animals, as they were a great part of the
time under water; add to this the great fatigue in
portage, you’will think I have pushed the men as
fast as could possibly have been. The officers,
volunteers, and privates have in general acted with the
greatest spirit and industry. 3
Arnold also sent a man named Jakins ahead to go to Sartigan, the first
French settlement on the Chaudiere, to determine the sentiments of the
settlers and gather any intelligence he could.

At the Great Carrying Place, the colonel took several precautionary measures.
First, he ordered a log hospital, large enough to house 8-10 sick, to be
built on the portage between Bast and Middle Carry Ponds.

Secondly, he

ordered a log structure built somewhere between the Kennebec and Bast
C a n y Pond.

This was to be a sort of supply d e p o t . ^

Colonel Farnsworth,

the Commissary was ordered to stock, this building with the extra provisions
left behind at Gardinerstown, so that the army would be able to eat should
some disaster force them to retreat.^
^ L e t t e r of Benedict Arnold to George Washington, Carrying Place,
October 13, 1775, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 72-73*
^Arnold, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 50-51*
^^Letter of Arnold to Colonel Farnsworth, Carrying Place, October 1k, 1775*
in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 7 3 .
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By October I**, two divisions had completed the 1^ mile portage to the
Dead River and the other two were well across, so Arnold broke camp and
again moved forward.

That day he crossed the half mile portage to small,

muddy, Middle Carry Pond, then across a root choked trail to the beautiful
West Carry Pond.

From his camp on the banks of that lake he could see the

snow covered peaks of Mount Bigelow a h e a d . ^

It was an inspiring sight,

one that tempted Major Meigs and Captain Hanchet to attempt scaling the
peak several days later as their division came into the vicinity.^

Sunday, October 15, saw Arnold crossing West Carry Pond and beginning the
arduous fourth portage from the third pond to the Dead River.

Most of the

afternoon was spent in climbing the mile long trail through a gap in the
ridges and in descending to the edge of a low savanna.

It took all of the

next morning to struggle across nearly 3 miles of bog, where the men often
sank to their knees in the mire.

This stretch was one of the most treach

erous for the men, laden with the clumsy batteaux and cumbersome provisions.
Nevertheless, by 1 :3 0 in the afternoon, the party had reached a small
tributary of the Dead River called Bog Brook.

There they were able to

again launch their boats, and after proceeding for a mile or so, they
reached the Dead River.

Here, in deep water with a gentle current, the

men were at last able to row the batteaux instead of dragging them through
the water.

However, the going was slow, for the river had endless loops

and it was days before they lost sight of Mount Bigelow.

Nevertheless,

Arnold covered almost 20 miles that afternoon, passing Morgan's division,

HOArnold, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 51 •
^ R e t u r n Jonathan Meigs, A Journal of the Occurrences within the
Observation of Return Jonathan Meigs, in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 178.

and then the deserted cabin of Natanis, the Indian who had frightened
Getchel and Berry into turning back several weeks earlier.

Three miles

beyond, Arnold camped with Greene's division; which was momentarily in the
lead.

On Tuesday; October IT; hunger first began to stalk the expedition.
suddenly realized that his division was out of flour.

Greene

Most had been

damaged by water, but it is likely that much had been "borrowed” by Morgan's
frontiersmen, who had dropped back to second in line of march the day
before.

Arnold decided to halt Greene and send back to the rear for some
LO

of the extra provisions.

Under the command of Major Bigelow,

with 12 batteaux returned to Colonel Enos for help.

$6 men

For 4 long days the

remainder of the division waited, occupying their time making cartridges.
On October 21, the relief party returned almost empty-handed.

Enos had

given them only two barrels of flour, saying he was short himself .^9

As Greene's division sat idly on the banks of the Bead River, they watched
as Morgan passed them on October 17, and Meigs on October 19moved forward himself on the afternoon of the 19th.

Arnold

The Bead River was

now becoming more like the Kennebec and he crossed 6 rips in the 2 l/2
leagues he went that day.

When he camped that night near modern Stratton,

it seemed to him that Mount Bigelow was still as close as ever.

^Arnold, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 51-53•
^%hayer, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 254-255*

19

A gentle rain had been falling that day as the airay pressed on.

In the

night it increased to a downpour, accompanied by a strong southwest wind.
The storm slowed the inarch, but did not halt it.
had risen 3 feet.

Arnold covered about 12 miles that day, first passing

Meigs and then Morgan.
swift.

There were

By October 21, the river

Progress was slow for the river was now very

k falls to surmount that day before the party camped,

about a mile ahead of Morgan.

Completely drenched by the incessant rain,

it was close to 11 before they had dried out enough to bed down.

It was not a long sleep.
camp.

At

k a.m., now October 22, a flood deluged the

The river had risen 8 feet in 9 hours.

Grabbing up their baggage,

the small band retreated hurriedly to a small hill.

Naturally the camps of Morgan and Meigs, downstream, were also hit by the
torrent.

Nevertheless the men went to work drying out all they could

salvage, they marched.

The going was almost impossible, for the current

was fierce against the batteaux.
around flooded creeks and valleys.

The land party had to detour for miles
Because the land was completely

inundated, it was hard to determine the true course of the river.

On the

following day, October 23, one party got lost and were several miles up
a branch of the river known today as Alder Stream when Arnold learned of
their error and sent after them.

The worst was yet to cone.
struck.

About 3 miles beyond Alder Stream, disaster

Seven boats were overturned and almost all of the few remaining

provisions lost, as the men attempted the seventh portage on the Bead River.
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Starvation now threatened to wipe out the entire expedition.
gone too far to turn back, and Canada was still far ahead.

They had
On the evening

of October 23, by the rapids known today as Shadagee Palls, Arnold called
all the officers present into a Council of War.
would certainly starve if they turned back.

The council decided they

Therefore, they must move

ahead in hopes of finding help at Sartigan, the first French settlement
on the Chaudiere.

Arnold, along with Captain Hanchet and 50 men would

rush forward, gather provisions at Sartigan, and ship them back to the
remainder of the men.

The sick, 26 in number, would be sent back and

Colonel Enos was to supply them with enough food to reach the settlements
on the Kennebec.

Greene and Enos were ordered to send ahead as many of

their men as they could feed for 15 days, and turn the rest back*

At noon on October 2^, Arnold set out on his race to the Chaudiere.

The

rain turned to snow, but before darkness closed in, he managed to cover
over 8 miles, portaging around two falls.

Next morning, after several

miles of rapid water, the party reached the first of the Chain of Ponds,
the long narrow string of lakes at the end of the Dead River.

Against

snow and wind, they rowed for over ten miles, finally camping on a small
connecting creek known as Horseshoe Stream today.

Portaging between

lakes, the group at length reached the last of the Chain of Ponds, today
known as Arnold Pond.
the

At

k in the afternoon of October 2k, they began

k mile portage across the Height of Land

Kennebec system and the Chaudiere system.

the divide between the

For two miles they toiled up a

35° ascent, and at length crossed the summit that today marks the MaineQuebec border.

Darkness overtook them before they had completed the portage.
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On October 27, Arnold found himself in a beautiful meadow, which he crossed
to a stream known today as the Arnold River.

Downstream, where the Arnold

River ran into Lake Megantic, there was a terrible swamp, with many
diverging channels and false mouths*

Here they met Lieutenants Steele and

Church, along with Jakins, the emissary to Sartigan.

They had good news.

Jakins reported that the inhabitants of Sartigan were friendly.

At Quebec,

there were few troops, Carleton and the regulars being at Montreal.

That night Arnold camped on the shores of Lake Megantic, after having
rescued Hanchet and his party from the swamp on the Arnold River by boat.
In the morning the colonel raced on by canoe, entering the Chaudiere itself
about 10.

Several times the party almost perished in the rapids on that

stream, but they covered 15 miles.
another

kO miles.

sighted a house.

On October 29, the river carried them

On October 30, after proceeding 15 miles further,

Arnold

They had at last reached Sartigan .'*0

Arnold had managed to break through.
close to starvation.

But what of the men straggling behind,

Those under Greene and Enos had been downstream from

the first two divisions when the Council of War had been held on October 2 3 .
Greene*s division,* whose supplies had been low for almost a week, was
doggedly moving ahead.

By October 2 5 , they were near the point where the

council had been held, Shadagee Falls.

Here, reduced to eating candles,

they halted to attempt to secure more supplies from Enos who was a few miles
behind.

Enos and his officers came up at noon, and asked for a council.

1
the subordinate officers in the Fourth Division wanted to turn back, but

5°Arnold, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 53-61.
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All

Greene and his officers stated their wish to continue forward.

A vote was

called, and Enos himself cast the deciding vote in favor of advancing. •
Nevertheless, the Fourth Division persisted in turning hack.
under with little protest.

Enos knuckled

Leaving Greene with only 2 l/2 barrels of flour,

the entire Fourth Division faced about, and inarched home.51

The men of Greene's, Meigs' and Morgan's divisions cursed Enos and his
troops heartily when they learned of their defection, but pressed o n . ^
The pace quickened because there was now very little to carry.

At the

portage across the Height of Land, most of the few remaining batteaux were
abandoned.

Misfortune continued to plague them, for they got completely

lost in the Alder Swamp at the mouth of the Arnold River, where they waded
around for a day or more looking for a way out.

This time lost during a race for survival almost spelled the end.

Yet the

men still pushed on, skirted Lake Megantic and started the descent of the
Chaudiere.
a day.

Since October 26, they had been subsisting on a pint of flour

They were now reduced to eating shoe leather or anything else they

could find substinence in.
the army were devoured.^

By November 1, the few dogs that had followed
Seme dug roots to remain alive.

On November 2,

the bulk of the army had not eaten for 48 hours, and many were falling by
the way.

Next day, November 3> the rest would probably have dropped, too.

That afternoon many thought they were close to their doom, for they imagined
they saw herds of cattle coming toward them.

On closer view they realized

^Senter, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 210-212.
^Dearborn, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 137.
53»Qiayer, Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 259-261.
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it was not a mirage*

Arnold had succeeded in securing supplies at Sartigan

and sending them hack to the starving men.

The army was saved.

The wilder-

ness had been conquered.^

By November 8 , all the stragglers had been rescued, the army had been
reorganized at Sartigan, and had pressed on down the Chaudiere.
arrived at Point Levi, just opposite Quebec, on November 10.

Arnold

By November

13 , two months after the departure from Cambridge, all were on the banks
of the St. Lawrence.

That evening they crossed that river in canoes, and

approached the walls of Quebec.

It is tragic that Arnold's expedition, which had overcome the northern
wilderness, could not overcome the British.

The letters the colonel had

written on October 13, to the American sympathizers in Quebec and to
General Schuyler fell into enemy hands and the British had begun preparing
for an assault.

One of the first precautions was to remove all the canoes

from the south bank of the St. Lawrence.^

Lieutenant Governor Hector

Cramahe also began putting the walls of Quebec in shape and enlisting
civilians for defense .^

Nevertheless, had Arnold been able to reach Quebec just a few days sooner,
victory might have been possible.

In the upper St. Lawrence area, Carleton

^ e n r y , Journal, in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 3^1-3^*2.
^Letter of Arnold to /Schuyler7j Point aux Trembles, November 27, 1775,
in Roberts, March to Quebec, p. 98 .
^^Letter of Arnold to John Manir, St. Mary's, November 7, 1775^ in
Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 8l-82.
' French, The First Year, p. 602.
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was being battered badly by Montgomery, who had succeeded Schuyler as
Commander of the forces invading from Lake Champlain.

St. John's was

captured on November 2, Montreal fell on November 1 3 .5 8

The retreating

British were trapped at Sorel, and the Americans captured 113 regulars and
all their provisions.

Carleton himself escaped only by disguising himself

as a Canadian and slipping through the American lines.59

It is possible that what saved Quebec was the destruction of the canoes
at Point Levi by the British.

Arnold quickly collected at least 20 others

from friendly Indians, but his crossing was delayed.

60

By the time he

had enough boats to cross the St. Lawrence, a severe storm developed,
delaying the crossing several days more.

6l

During that storm, 80 veterans

under MacLean were able to slip into the city.

MacLean, a phenomenal

leader, was able to organize all the British elements in the city into a
force sufficient to defend the city.

The 9^8 sailors, merchant seamen,

and traders, plus 300 Canadian militia brought the number of men defending
the walls to over 1,300, when added to MacLean's own band of eighty.

62

Arnold, with only 550 effectives and 5 rounds of ammunition per man, saw
that he had no chance of taking the city alone, so withdrew on November 18

^French, The First Year, pp. 429-^30.

59 Ibld., p. 6 02 .
^°Letter of Arnold to Richard Montgomery, St. Marie, November 8 , 1775,
in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 82 -8 3 .
^ L e t t e r of Arnold to Montgomery, Point Levi, November
Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 85 -86 .
^French, Ihe First Year, pp. 606 -607 .
25.

lk, 1775* in

fa
to Point aux Trembles, some 20 miles above Quebec, to await Montgomery.
The two American forces made a Juncture on December 2, and the combined
forces, numbering about 1,000, began a seige of Quebec on December 5*
Carleton, now* in command of the garrison, merely lay behind his walls.
In desperation, the American forces assaulted the city on the night of
December 30, 1775*

In snow and darkness they were able to enter the

lower part of the city.

However, British fire killed Montgomery, and

Arnold was severly wounded in the leg.

Confused and lost in the maze of

narrow streets, the Americans were surrounded.
were killed or wounded, and 400 captured.
Canada was virtually over.

In the fighting, 60 men

The American expedition to

6k

Arnold's march to Quebec is worthy of national recognition, despite its
ultimate failure.

It was a brilliant piece of strategy that came within

a hair of changing the destiny of the North American continent.
realized that there was an element of risk.
Arnold, Washington noted that

In his instructions

All had
to

• . the Winter Season is now advancing

and the Success of this Enterprize, (under God) depends wholly upon the
Spirit with which it is pushed, and the favorable Disposition of the
Canadians and the Indians.

Nevertheless, the Commander in Chief was

fa
■^Letter of Arnold to Washington, Point aux Trembles, November 20, 1775>
in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 93-9^^French, The First Year, pp. 610 -619 .

6*5

^Instructions of Washington to Arnold, Cambridge, October 14, 1775> in
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. I H , p. 492.
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willing to gamble, for he felt success was "of the utmost Consequence to
the Interest and Liberties of America."^

3he expedition was well received by the natives of Canada.

Arnold was

able to secure food from the French inhabitants, and at least some of the

67

Indians joined his army. 1

From all appearances it would seem that,

Arnold taken Quebec, he would have had no trouble establishing effective
control over the Canadians.

For the period, the expedition was organized and dispatched with incredible
speed.

The idea of a march through the back door to Canada didn't take

definite shape until August 20, when Washington wrote Schuyler for his
advice.

One month later, on September 20, the men had been recruited,

the supplies gathered, the batteaux had been built, and the army was de
barking on the Kennebec.

Paradoxically, this initial haste proved to be the doom of the expedition.
Not enough time was spent in examining the route and the estimated 210
miles between the mouth of the Kennebec and Quebec
350.

6q
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turned out to be

Even worse, insufficient time was given to a survey of conditions
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Instructions of Washington to Arnold, Cambridge, October 14, 1775* in
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washingtons III, p. 491.
^ L e t t e r of Arnold to Washington, Point Levi, November 8 , 1775* in
Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 84-85^ L e t t e r of Washington to the President of Congress, Cambridge, September 21,
1775* in Smith, Arnold's March, pp. 22-23.
^ L e t t e r of Arnold to ^Schuyler7, Point aux Trembles, November 27* 1775*
in Roberts, March to Quebec, pp. 97-$#.
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